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Abstract 
The Attentional Control Theory (ACT) proposes that high-anxious individuals maintain 
performance effectiveness (accuracy) at the expense of processing efficiency (response 
time), in particular, the two central executive functions of inhibition and shifting.  In 
contrast, research has generally failed to consider the third executive function which relates 
to the function of updating.   In the current study, seventy-five participants completed the 
Parametric Go/No-Go and n-back tasks, as well as the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory in 
order to explore the effects of anxiety on attention.  Results indicated that anxiety lead to 
decay in processing efficiency, but not in performance effectiveness, across all three 
Central Executive functions (inhibition, set-shifting and updating).  Interestingly, 
participants with high levels of trait anxiety also exhibited impaired performance 
effectiveness on the n-back task designed to measure the updating function.  Findings are 
discussed in relation to developing a new model of ACT that also includes the role of 
preattentive processes and dual-task coordination when exploring the effects of anxiety on 
task performance. 
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Introduction 
Much empirical attention has been devoted to the influence of anxiety on task performance 
across a variety of domains, such as test anxiety [1, 2] and sports performance [3, 4]. 
Behavioural evidence has emerged to indicate that high levels of anxiety are associated 
with decreased task performance, especially on tasks that are mentally demanding [5, 6].  
While a number of theories have been developed in an attempt to explain the complex 
relationship between anxiety and task performance, the Attentional Control Theory (ACT) 
remains the only theory that can account for both the facilitative and debilitative effect of 
anxiety reported in the literature [4]. ACT is considered a major extension of the 
Processing Efficiency Theory (PET), developed by Eysenck and Calvo [7], which proposes 
that worry (the main cognitive component of anxiety) affects task performance through 
pre-empting some of the processing and storage capacity of the Working Memory system. 
As a result, anxious individuals experience decreased performance on tasks that place high 
demands upon Working Memory.  Eysenck and Calvo [7] proposed that worry also leads 
to an increase in motivation in order to preserve task performance level, resulting in the 
allocation of additional processing resources (effort) and the deployment of processing 
activities (compensatory strategy) aimed at improving task performance. 
While PET received encouraging support from many behavioural studies using 
various cognitive and motor tasks [4, 8-10], there are several limitations of the theory in 
accounting for the effect of anxiety on cognitive performance.  For example, Eysenck et al. 
[11] highlighted PET’s lack of precision in predicting the effects of anxiety.  As a result, 
Attentional Control Theory (ACT) was developed as a significant advancement to the PET. 
Specifically, ACT builds upon the strength of PET by incorporating its emphasis on 
processing efficiency and performance effectiveness, and addresses previous limitations 
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through extending the scope of the theory to include a more precise explanation of the 
effects of anxiety on the Central Executive functions.  
A central tenet of ACT is the prediction that anxiety impacts task performance 
through its deleterious effects on attentional control, a crucial component of the Central 
Executive [12].This is because anxiety is often experienced when a current goal is under 
threat.  In order to preserve goal attainment, individuals would allocate attentional 
resources to the identification and processing of the source of the potential threat [11]. This 
assumption is supported by findings that anxious individuals demonstrate attentional bias 
towards threat-related stimuli in the presence of neutral ones [12-14].  A further 
assumption of ACT is that anxiety can cause impairment in attentional control without the 
presence of threat-related, task–irrelevant stimuli. Eysenck et al. [11] postulated that when 
an individual feels threatened, it could be counter-productive to continue directing high 
levels of attentional resources towards a specific location. Rather, the optimal strategy 
would be to distribute attentional resources widely, subsequently reducing the amount of 
attention available towards the current task [11].  
The above theoretical assumptions of ACT are based on the premise that the 
allocation of attentional resources is governed by the interaction of two attentional systems 
proposed by Corbetta and Shulman [15]: the Goal-Driven Attentional System (GDAS) and 
the Stimulus-Driven Attentional System (SDAS). GDAS exemplifies top-down attentional 
control, and is shaped by the individual’s current goals, knowledge and expectations; 
whereas SDAS exemplifies bottom-up attentional control, and is influenced by salient 
environmental stimuli [12]. Corbetta and Shulman proposed that an optimal balance 
between these two systems is achieved through bidirectional interaction of the two 
systems, and that disturbance of this balance would result in decreased attentional control. 
Within ACT, anxiety disrupts the balance between these two systems, with increased 
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anxiety leading to a decreased influence of GDAS and an increased influence of the SDAS 
through preferential processing to (and inhibit disengaging from) task-irrelevant threat-
related stimuli.  
Based on lower level functions of the Central Executive component that have 
previously been proposed [16- 18] three major Central Executive functions have been 
identified which are inhibition, set-shifting and updating.  Inhibition involves the use of 
attentional control in a restraining manner to prevent attentional resources being distributed 
to task-irrelevant stimuli [11].  The shifting function identified by Miyake [18] is also 
related to Attentional Control Theory, because it involves the use of attentional control in a 
positive manner in terms of shifting attentional resources to remain focused on task-
relevant stimuli. However, Eysenck et al. [11] stated that the influence of anxiety on the 
shifting function is less clear and should be further explored.  Results from subsequent 
studies by Ansari, Derakshan and Richards [19] and Ansari and Derakshan [20] using a 
mixed antissaccade paradigm, in which participants were occasionally instructed to make 
an intentional saccade to the direction opposite the stimulus, appeared to provide support 
for this hypothesis. Reduced inhibition was also observed through the use of task-irrelevant 
distracters, providing further support for the notion of impoverished inhibition due to 
anxiety [21]. 
However importantly, no existing experiments have explored the effects of anxiety 
on the updating function as predicted by ACT. Behaviourally, the effects of anxiety on the 
updating function has yielded inconsistent results [11]. According to Derakshan and 
Eysenck [12], because the updating function involves memory instead of attention, it is not 
directly affected by anxiety. Thus, the most important assumption of ACT is that anxiety 
negatively affects the processing efficiency of the set-shifting and inhibition functions, and 
that anxiety is presumed to only influence the updating function under stressful conditions. 
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However, to the author’s knowledge, this assumption of ACT has not been empirically 
tested.  According to a recent review of the theory by Berggren and Derakshan [22], 
studies exploring the effects of anxiety on the monitoring and updating of working 
memory are lacking, such as when participants have to maintain mental representations in 
memory and must constantly update that information. Thus, the current study intended to 
further explore whether anxiety also impacts upon the updating function using the n-back 
task, which requires participants to constantly maintain and update mental representations 
within the working memory. 
ACT has received encouraging empirical support using mixed antisaccade 
paradigms [19, 23], which has demonstrated the effect of anxiety on task switching and 
inhibition to be consistent with the predictions of ACT.   However, a criticism of the 
current anxiety-cognition literature is that many studies have employed only one single 
cognitive task in their design.  More specifically, Shackman et al. [24] proposes that 
multiple tasks should be employed in order to allow for accurate inferences about the 
specificity of any observed affective modulation. This is because if only a single cognitive 
task is used and the manipulation of anxiety results in a significant effect on task 
performance, it would be difficult to infer the specificity of the effect [24]. This limitation 
is especially relevant to studies on Attentional Control Theory, as the inhibition, shifting, 
and updating functions are partially interdependent [11].  This poses a significant challenge 
in the interpretation of studies that claim to be supportive of ACT. To date, none of the 
published studies that provided experimental support for ACT have employed multiple 
cognitive tasks to assess changes in all three Central Executive functions resulting from the 
induction of anxiety. Additionally, it has been proposed that research needs to be extended 
and utilise cognitive tasks that are psychometrically equivalent and possess a well-
characterised cognitive structure [24].  More specifically, using cognitive tasks that have a 
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well-understood functional neuroanatomy character, such as the Go/No-Go task will allow 
researchers to infer the plausible loci of any observed Anxiety by Cognition interactions 
[24].   This limitation is pertinent to the experimental studies of ACT due to the use of the 
antisaccade task as the measure of cognitive performance. While saccadic performance 
may reflect an individual’s level of attentional control, it can also reflect behavioural 
inhibition that may not be related to attention, such as control of eye movements [19].  
Finally, studies that used the PGNG task typically only adopt accuracy rate (percentage of 
correct set-shifting/inhibitory trials) as a measure of performance effectiveness and thus 
fail to account for other response types (e.g. false alarms). Taken together, these limitations 
restrict the interpretations that can be drawn from the results of the current body of 
research on ACT, although it is noted that that the theoretical framework remains popular 
as it is the only one that considers the distinction between performance effectiveness and 
processing efficiency.  
The current study aimed to utilise more compatible cognitive measures (go/no-go 
task and n-back task) designed to specifically test the effect of anxiety on the updating 
function, as well as simultaneously gauge the effect of anxiety on each of the Central 
Executive functions proposed by Miyake et al.[18]. Participants’ trait anxiety levels were 
expected to negatively impact their levels of processing efficiency on their Central 
Executive functions of set-shifting, inhibition and updating, indexed by their averaged 
response time in the Go/No-Go task (set-shifting and inhibition) and the numeric n-back 
task (updating). The performance effectiveness of these functions, as indexed by the values 
of d’ of the correct inhibitory set (inhibition), correct target set (shifting) and the d’ values 
in the numeric n-back task (updating)  was expected to be similar across high and low-trait 
anxious participants.   
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In sum, four hypotheses were proposed. First, consistent with findings of previous 
studies that used the PGNG and n-back tasks [25, 26], both high and low anxious 
participants would demonstrate increased response time as the task increased in difficulty. 
Secondly, under ACT, compared to low anxious participants, decay in processing 
efficiency (i.e. longer RT) due to task difficulty would be greater for high anxious 
participants on both the PGNG and n-back tasks. Thirdly, both high and low trait anxious 
participants’ levels of accuracy (i.e. values of d’) were expected to deteriorate with 
increased task difficulty. The fourth hypothesis was that according to ACT, anxiety would 
impair processing efficiency (i.e. RT) to a greater extent than performance effectiveness 
(i.e. accuracy).  
  
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-five university students (53 female) participated in the experiment. 
Participants ranged from 17 to 47 years old (M = 24.45, SD = 7.77). All participants 
received entry to a prize draw of one of two $100.00 shopping vouchers upon completion 
of the experiment. 
Design  
The study adopted a quasi-experimental between-subjects design. The independent 
variable was levels of trait anxiety, operationalised across two levels of high (≥ 38) and 
low anxiety (≤ 37) using scores obtained from the STAI (Form Y-2). The first set of 
dependent variables was processing efficiency, indexed by the averaged response time of 
correct trials at each level of the PGNG and n-back tasks. The second set of dependent 
variables was performance effectiveness, indexed by stimuli sensitivity (d’), determined by 
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the proportion of hits and false alarms, for the set-shifting and inhibition function from the 
PGNG task, and the updating function from the n-back task.  
Materials and Procedure 
Upon arrival at the testing room, each participant was assigned a computer 
equipped with the PGNG and n-back software. Participants were then instructed to provide 
informed written consent, and complete Form Y-2 of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI; 27). The researcher then explained the format of the experimental trial and 
provided detailed instruction of the experiment. The Parametric Go/No-Go and n-back 
tasks were presented in counterbalanced order, separated by a short break between the two 
tasks. The experiment began with screen instructions for the according task on 
participants’ computer screens.  
Parametric Go/No-Go task  
The Parametric Go/No-Go (PGNG) task, designed to measure the inhibition and 
shifting functions, is described in detail elsewhere [28]. Briefly, the PGNG consisted of 
three levels of difficulty, completed in order of ascending difficulty. Participants were 
shown a series of letters on the computer screen for 1s per letter with no interstimulus 
interval, and were required to click on the ‘Target Present’ button whenever the presented 
letter met the specified rule of the trial. For the first 210 trials (i.e. Level 1) of the PGNG 
task, participants had to click ‘Target Present” whenever the letter X, Y, or Z was 
presented. For the second 210 trials (i.e. Level 2), participants had to respond when the 
letter presented was either X or Y, in a non-repeating order.  In other words, participants 
had to click the ‘Target Present’ button only if the last responded letter was different to the 
current letter.  For the third 210 trials (i.e. Level 3), participants had to respond to the 
target set X, Y, or Z using the same non-repeating rule as level 2. For example, if the last 
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responded letter was ‘X’, then participants had to click ‘Target Present’ as soon as they 
were presented ‘Y’ or ‘Z’, but had to inhibit from responding to ‘X’. 
For the purpose of testing ACT in the current study, participants’ performance 
effectiveness was based on the measure of stimuli sensitivity (d’) to take into account the 
proportion of false alarms as well as hits, providing a more comprehensive understanding 
of participants’ response style. A ‘Hit’ required the participants correctly clicked on the 
‘Target Present’ button when the presented stimuli met the specified rule of the trial, 
whereas a ‘False Alarm’ occurred when the presented stimuli did not meet the specified 
rule of the trial and the participant incorrectly clicked ‘Target Present’.  
Each level of the PGNG task consisted of 210 trials, with the initial 5 trials as 
practice trials.  Each level consisted of 28 hit trials for the set shifting function and 15 hit 
trials for the inhibition function, with the remaining trials as rejection trials for each 
function. The sequence of hit and miss trials were the same across all participants. 
N-back task 
The n-back task [29] was used to gauge participants’ updating function. It required 
respondents to consciously follow a series of numbers and respond when they saw a 
number that was presented at the previous trial (1-back), after one intervening number (2-
back), or after two intervening numbers (3-back). Numbers were used in this task to 
prevent the carry-over effect associated with the use of letters in the PGNG task. Similar to 
the PGNG task, the three levels of the task were presented in order of ascending difficulty. 
For all three levels, a serial stream of single digits (1 to 9) was presented on the computer 
screen. Each number was presented for 500ms with no interstimulus interval.  
Participants were required to click the ‘Target Present’ button whenever the 
presented digit met the specified rule of the trial. For the first 60 trials, participants were 
asked to click the ‘Target Present’ button whenever the digit displayed was the same as the 
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one shown in the previous trial (e.g. 3, 3). For the second 60 trials, participants were 
required to click the ‘Target Present’ button whenever the digit displayed on the screen 
was identical to the one presented two trials earlier (e.g. 3, 2, 3). For the third 60 trials, 
participants were required to respond whenever the on-screen digit was same as the one 
displayed three trials earlier (e.g. 3, 2, 6, 3).  
Similar to the PGNG task, stimuli sensitivity (d’) was used to measure the 
performance effectiveness of the participant’s updating function; while the processing 
efficiency of participant’s updating function was indexed by their averaged reaction time 
for the correct target trials. Each level of the n-back task consisted of five practice trials, 
followed by 55 target trials. Ten target trials of each level were hit trials, while the 
remaining trials for each level were rejection trials. The sequence of hit and miss trials was 
the same across all participants. 
Upon conclusion of both the PGNG task and the numeric n-back task, participants 
were required to complete the remaining questionnaires, which concluded the experiment. 
Participants were then debriefed and dismissed.  
Results 
Participants scores on the STAI as well as their processing efficiency (RT) and 
performance effectiveness (accuracy, indexed by d’) on the PGNG and n-back tasks were 
analysed. Histograms revealed one outlying case, with a score of zero on all levels of both 
the PGNG and n-back tasks,  which was excluded from analysis. The median trait anxiety 
score for the sample was 37.5. Similar to Ansari et al. (2008) and Derakshan et al. (2009), 
median  splits on the trait anxiety questionnaire was used to produce high and low anxiety 
group classifications. Subsequent statistical analysis considered participants who obtained 
trait anxiety scores of 37 or below as low anxious (N = 37, M = 30.51, SD = 4.47), and 38 
or above as high anxious (N = 37, M = 47.22, SD = 8.55). 
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Central Executive Functions 
A series of mixed model ANOVAs were conducted to assess the effects of trait 
anxiety on performance effectiveness (d’) and efficiency (RT) across each of the Central 
Executive functions of set-shifting, inhibition and updating. As the PGNG task 
simultaneously measures the set-shifting and inhibition functions, a combined response 
time was used for both functions.  
Response Times for Set-Shifting and Inhibition Functions 
As illustrated in Figure 1, task difficulty had a significant main effect upon 
participants’ response times for the Set-Shifting and Inhibition functions of the PGNG 
task, indicating that participants took longer to respond as the task increased in difficulty, F 
(2, 71) = 64.74, p <.001, ηp2 =.65. Specifically, Level 3 elicited longer response times than 
either Level 1, F (1, 72) = 80.02, p <.001, ηp2 =.53, and Level 2, F (1, 72) = 112.70, p < 
.001, ηp2 =.61. A significant main effect of anxiety was also found, F (1, 72) = 13.04, p 
=.001, ηp2= .15. On average, high trait anxious participants took 45.04ms (95% CI from 
20.39ms to 69.42 ms) longer to respond to the stimuli than did low trait anxious 
participants.  There was also a significant interaction between trait anxiety and task 
difficulty on response times, F (2, 71) = 3.45, p =.037, ηp2 =.09; indicating that the effect 
of task difficulty on response time varied depending on the level of trait anxiety. 
Specifically, high trait anxious participants took significantly longer than low anxious 
participants to respond to task stimuli in the more mentally demanding Level 2, F (1, 72) = 
13.50, p = <.001, ηp2 =.16, and Level 3, F (1, 72) = 15.80, p <.001, ηp2 = .18, suggesting 
that trait anxiety accelerates the increase in response time with increased task difficulty. 
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Figure 1. Mean response times (ms) for low- and high-anxious individuals comparing task 
difficulty levels for the set-shifting and inhibition targets on the PGNG task (error bars = 
SE). 
Set-Shifting 
Accuracy.  Task difficulty had a significant main effect on the accuracy rate of the 
set-shifting trials, F (2, 71) = 15.39, p <.001, ηp2 = .30 (see Figure 2). Participants 
experienced a rapid decay in accuracy between Level 1 and Level 2, F (1, 72) = 21.65, p 
<.001, ηp2 = .23, while participants’ stimuli sensitivity was similar between Levels 2 and 3, 
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F (1, 72) = .17, p =.69,  ηp2= .002. Participants’ levels of trait anxiety had no main effect on 
accuracy rates, F (1, 72) = .33, p = .57, ηp2 = .005. Finally, task difficulty and trait anxiety 
had no interaction effect on response accuracy, F (2, 71) = .20, p = .82, ηp2 = .005. 
 
Figure 2. Mean response accuracy (d’) for low- and high-anxious individuals comparing 
task difficulty levels for the set-shifting targets on the PGNG task (error bars = SE). 
 
Inhibition  
Accuracy. As expected, task difficulty had no significant main effect on response 
accuracy, F (1, 72) = 1.38, p = .25. ηp2 = .02 (see Figure 3). Further, no significant main 
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effect was found for trait anxiety on response accuracy, F (1, 72) = .02, p = .89, ηp2 < .001. 
Finally, trait anxiety and task difficulty had no significant interaction effect on response 
accuracy, F (1, 72) = .36, p =.55, ηp2 = .005.  
 
 
Figure 3. Mean response accuracy (d’) for low- and high-anxious individuals comparing 
task difficulty levels for the inhibition targets on the PGNG task (error bars = SE). 
Updating 
Response time. As shown in Figure 4, increasing task difficulty had a significant 
main effect upon participants’ response times for the n-back task, F (2, 71) = 47.69, p 
<.001, ηp2= .57. Specifically, the most mentally demanding 3-back level elicited longer 
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response times than both the 1-back level, F (1, 72) = 87.76, p <.001, ηp2 = .55, and the 2-
back level, F (1, 72) = 17.65, p <.001, ηp2 = .20 . Trait anxiety had a significant main effect 
on response time, F (1, 72) = 9.06, p =.004, ηp2 =.11. Compared to low trait-anxious 
participants, participants who reported high trait anxiety took, on average, 77.45ms, with a 
95% confidence interval ranging from 26.15ms to 128.76 ms, longer to respond to task 
stimuli across the 3 difficulty levels.  
Although Figure 4 indicates that, compared to low trait anxious participants, high 
trait anxious participants demonstrated longer response times with increased task 
difficulty, the interaction between task difficulty and trait anxiety was found to be non-
significant, F (2,71) = 1.37, p = .26, ηp2 = .04, with an observed power of .29. However, 
compared to low anxious participants, high anxious participants recorded significantly 
longer RT in level 2, F (1, 72) = 8.91, p = .001, ηp2 = .11, and level 3, F (1, 72) = 5.45, p 
=.02, ηp2 = .07, but not in level 1, F (1, 72) = 3.05, p = .09, ηp2 =.04.  
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Figure 4. Mean response times (ms) for low- and high-anxious individuals comparing task 
difficulty levels for the updating (n-back) task (error bars = SE). 
 
Accuracy. Increasing difficulty of the n-back task had a substantial effect upon 
participants’ accuracy rate, F (2, 71) = 198.60, p <.001, ηp2= .85. As illustrated in Figure 5, 
participants were significantly less accurate in Level 3 than Level 1, F (1, 72) = 401.99, p 
<.001, ηp2 = .85, and Level 2, F (1, 72) = 41.60, p <.001, ηp2 = .37. Trait anxiety had no 
main effect on accuracy, F (1, 72) = .44, p = .51, ηp2 = .006. Finally, task difficulty and 
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trait anxiety had a significant interaction effect upon participants’ accuracy rates, F (2, 71) 
= 3.14, p = .05, ηp2 = .08. Specifically, compared to low-trait anxious participants, high 
trait anxious participants were significantly less accurate in their responses in Level 3 of 
the n-back task, F (1, 72) = 10.58, p =.002, ηp2 =.13.  
 
Figure 5. Mean response accuracy (d’) for low- and high-anxious individuals comparing 
task difficulty levels on the updating (n-back) task (error bars = SE). 
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Discussion 
The present study aimed to establish whether high anxious individuals maintain 
performance effectiveness (accuracy, as indexed by d’) at the expense of processing 
efficiency (response time), using cognitive tasks that exert a high demand on Central 
Executive functions. The current study is one of the first to examine the predictions of the 
Attentional Control Theory for the updating function and to simultaneously test the effects 
of anxiety on all three central executive functions under the premise of ACT .  Overall, the 
results from the cognitive tasks indicated that anxiety lead to decay in processing 
efficiency, but not in performance effectiveness, across all three Central Executive 
functions (inhibition, set-shifting and updating).  
Research Findings 
Congruent with previous studies that used the PGNG [26] and n-back tasks [25], 
both high and low anxious participants would demonstrate decreased processing efficiency 
(i.e. longer RT) with increased task difficulty in both the PGNG and n-back tasks. The 
second hypothesis, that the decay in processing efficiency (i.e. longer RT) due to task 
difficulty would be greater for high anxious participants, was also supported in both the 
PGNG and n-back tasks. This is consistent with ACT as it proposes that anxiety disrupts 
the balance between the Goal-Driven Attentional System (GDAS) and the Stimulus-Driven 
Attentional System (SDAS), leading to a decrease in processing efficiency on the 
attentional control functions of set-shifting, inhibition and updating [11].  This finding is 
also in line with previous studies that investigated the effects of trait anxiety on response 
times in a range of cognitive tasks [19, 23](e.g. Ansari et al., 2008; Derakshan et al., 2009). 
Further, participants’ performance effectiveness deteriorated with increased task 
difficult. Participants’ levels of accuracy demonstrated the expected decline with increased 
task difficulty across all but the inhibition function. This is not surprising given 
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participants’ accuracy rates were similar across the more difficult levels of the set-shifting 
function, suggesting a less mentally demanding task level, similar to Level 1 of the set-
shifting function, is required to gauge the inhibitory function .   
Finally, anxiety impaired processing efficiency to a greater extent than performance 
effectiveness. The decreases in performance effectiveness due to increased task difficulty 
were similar across both high and low anxious participants. Compared to low anxious 
participants, high anxious participants demonstrated a more rapid decrease in their 
accuracy rate in the most demanding level of the n-back task. This is consistent with the 
prediction of ACT [11], that anxiety impairs processing efficiency (and sometimes 
effectiveness) of the Updating function only under demanding situations. While this 
finding is in line with those of Darke [30] and Calvo, Ramos, and Estevez [31], who 
compared the performance of high and low anxious participants on reading-span tasks, it 
contradicts Sorg and Whitney’s [32] findings of no-clear differences on the Updating task 
between high and low anxious participants, possibly due to the undemanding nature of the 
tasks used in Sorg and Whitney’s study.   
Considerations of Research Findings 
While ACT has received substantial support both from past research and from the 
present results, it does not appear to take account of the distinction between attentive and 
preattentive processes. According to Wolfe, Treisman, and Horowitz [33], successful 
theories of attention must consider the role of preattentive processes. Neisser [34] 
pioneered the theoretical distinction between controlled (i.e. attentive) and automatic (i.e. 
preattentive) processes of attention. Controlled processes are operated sequentially, require 
attention and have a limited capacity. Whereas automatic processes are well-learned 
behavioural sequences automatically triggered by environmental stimuli, do not require 
conscious attention and can operate in parallel with other processes [35]. Further, 
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Schneider and Schiffrin demonstrated that, given sufficient practice, tasks which require 
controlled attention may become automatic.  
Based on observation of mental lapses, Norman and Shallice [36] expanded on the 
preattentive/attentive distinction, and proposed that ongoing actions (e.g. driving) are 
typically carried out through a process of contention scheduling. According to Norman and 
Shallice, preattentive processes would result in attentional lapses if left entirely to their 
own devices. As a result, an automatic conflict resolution process, namely contention 
scheduling, is required to prioritise actions based on the strength of the stimuli and 
individuals’ expectations, knowledge and goals. An example of contention scheduling is 
that most drivers have experienced driving while preoccupied with other thoughts. Despite 
having no clear recollection of the journey travelled, they would have successfully 
negotiated winding roads and driving obstacles. In addition, Norman and Shallice proposed 
that in situations where automatic contention scheduling becomes inadequate to preserve 
task performance, the supervisory attentional system can intervene to take over conscious 
attentional control, through priming or inhibiting certain actions1.  
Perhaps the most direct evidence for including the role of contention scheduling in 
ACT is the converging support of its resemblance to dual-task coordination and the 
importance of dual-task coordination on the Central Executive. According to Baddeley 
[16], dual-task coordination is considered a major Central Executive function. Collette and 
Van der Linden’s [37] review of neuroimaging studies concluded that along with 
inhibition, set-shifting and updating, dual-task coordination should be considered as a 
function of the Central Executive system. Baddeley’s position regarding the role of dual-
task coordination is further supported by neuropsychological studies that found, when 
                                               
1 The supervisory attentional system (SAS) was later adopted by Baddeley as a framework 
for the Central Executive of the Working Memory model (Baddeley, 2007), also the 
primary focus of the present study. 
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compared to performance decay on individual tasks, patients with suspected executive 
function deficits, such as frontal lobe lesions, traumatic brain injury, Parkinson’s and 
Alzheimer’s disease, exhibited disproportionately larger dual-task decrements [16]. 
Conversely,  Baddeley, Della Sala, Gray, Papagno, and Spinnler [38], Fournier-Vicente, 
Larigauderie, and Gaonac’h [39], McDowell, Whyte, and D’Esposito [40], and Miyake et 
al. [18] reported no correlation between performance on dual-task coordination measures 
and performance on any of the storage-and-processing Central Executive functions 
(updating, set-shifting and inhibition). The lack of correlation between performance on 
dual-task coordination and the inhibition, set-shifting and updating functions led Miyake et 
al. [18] to exclude dual-task coordination from their list of Central Executive functions.  
In an attempt to reconcile the conflicting findings regarding the relationship 
between dual-task coordination and the traditional Central Executive functions, Fournier-
Vicente et al. [39] proposed that dual-task coordination may be a Central Executive 
function that taps different aspects of executive functioning independent of the three 
functions of updating, set-shifting and inhibition. It is proposed here that the conflicting 
findings of dual-task coordination can be reconciled by interpreting it as a function of 
contention scheduling, modulating the influence of the Goal-Directed and Stimulus-Driven 
Attentional Control systems. This interpretation is in line with findings from neuroimaging 
studies which have reported dual-task performance results in greater recruitment of brain 
regions already activated by component tasks, rather than activation of a novel region [37]. 
The assumption of dual-task coordination as a function of contention scheduling (the 
interaction between Goal-Directed and Stimulus-Driven Attentional Systems) is further 
supported by the low test-retest reliabilities reported by Baddeley et al. [41] and Fournier-
Vicente et al. [39]. This is because within the proposed model, dual-task coordination 
results from the interaction of individuals’ current expectations, knowledge and goals and 
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the strength of the salient environmental stimuli, thus it should only reflect current 
situations.  
Future Directions 
According to Derakshan and Eysenck [12], the need of more “process-pure” tasks 
that reflect primarily a single underlying Central Executive process is needed to accurately 
pinpoint the Central Executive function(s) that is/are most impaired by anxiety. The 
current study endeavoured to progress in this direction through the use of the PGNG and n-
back tasks, and improved upon traditional studies of ACT that may be confounded by 
behavioural inhibition such as control of eye movements. However, the PGNG tasks 
combined processing efficiency measures for the set-shifting and inhibition functions, 
making it difficult to identify if one of these two functions are differentially affected by 
anxiety. Moreover, using a battery of comparable “process-pure” tasks to test the effects of 
anxiety on the Central Executive functions would allow researchers to discern which 
function(s) is/are most affected by anxiety.  
The predictions of ACT are based on Miyake et al.’s [18] conclusion that the three 
Central Executive functions are set-shifting, inhibition and updating. As has been 
described, the role of preattentive processes and the underlying mechanism of differential 
influence in the Goal-Directed and the Stimulus-Driven Attentional Systems remains 
unexplored in the current ACT model. Specifically, the potential role of contention 
scheduling and dual-task coordination reflects the need for ACT to be reviewed and 
extended to account for the effects of anxiety on preattentive processes. Although findings 
from the present study do not validate that dual-task coordination and contention 
scheduling form part of the attentional control system, findings from previous behavioural 
and neuropsychological studies are in agreement with this hypothesis. Additional 
investigation is required to test the proposed revision of ACT , through examining the 
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effects of anxiety on dual-task coordination. This can be achieved through replicating the 
current experiment in conjunction with a dual task that involves automatic and attentive 
processes, such as the Stroop task. Finally, the current findings indicate future research 
should consider including a less mentally demanding level for the inhibition function to 
test the effects of anxiety on inhibition when it is not under mental strain.  
Implications for Attentional Control Theory 
The current study demonstrated that anxiety significantly impairs processing 
efficiency of the updating function as well as the inhibition and set-shifting functions. 
While this is consistent with Eysenck et al.’s [11] original predictions of ACT, it 
contradicts a recent review of the theory by Derakshan and Eysenck [12], in part due to the 
failure to use mentally demanding tasks to test the updating function in some of the 
reviewed studies.  
On the experimental level, the PGNG and n-back tasks used in the current study 
produced findings that are consistent with the antisaccade paradigm studies by Ansari et al. 
[19] and Derakshan et al. [23], indicating these tasks as useful research tools for future 
investigations of the Attentional Control Theory. However it should be noted that current 
findings suggest a less mentally demanding level is required for the inhibition function to 
test the effects of anxiety on inhibition when the Central Executive under not under high 
demand. On the theoretical level, the current study reflected the need of ACT to consider 
the effects of anxiety on preattentive processes, in particular, incorporating the role of 
contention scheduling and dual-task coordination into the theory using the proposed model 
of ACT that incorporates the role of dual-task coordination and contention scheduling.  
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